LAW OFFICES OF LAVOIE & JARMAN ROBERT L. LAVOIE. Bar No. 80297 2 888 S. West Street, Suite 400 Anaheim, CA 92802 3 (714) 774-2113 Attorneys for CHRISTINE KEERS 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 10 CHRISTINE KEERS, 11 CASE NO. 280267 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 12 Plaintiff, 13 vs. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL CITY OF RIVERSIDE, KENNETH FORTIER, 14 MICHAEL SMITH, ALBERT BROWN, RON ADAMS, and DOES 1 through 100, 15 Inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 I. **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS** 19

- 1. This case is brought pursuant to the California Fair, Employment Housing Act ("FEHA"), Government Code Section 12900 et seq., and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. This Action seeks compensatory damages that are permitted by said legislation.
- The claims alleged herein arose in the County of Riverside, California.
- 3. Plaintiff, CHRISTINE KEERS, is a female residing in Riverside County, California.
- 4. Defendant CITY OF RIVERSIDE ("CITY") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a municipality in the State of California.

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

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- 5. Defendant KENNETH FORTIER ("CHIEF FORTIER") was at all applicable times mentioned herein, the Chief of Police of CITY. As such, he was responsible for the day to day operation of the City's police department.
- 6. Defendant RON ADAMS ("ADAMS"), was at all times mentioned herein, an employee of CITY and a detective in the City's police department.
- 7. Defendants DOE 1-100 are each responsible in some manner for the injuries and damages alleged herein. The true names and capacities of defendants DOE 1-100, Inclusive, are presently unknown to plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore alleges on information and belief, that each of them is the agent and servent of the other and is responsible in some manner for the injuries alleged herein. Plaintiff therefore sues Defendants DOE 1-100, by such fictitious names and will seek leave to amend this complaint to add their true names when the same have been ascertained.
- 8. At all times mentioned herein, each individual defendant was acting in the course and scope of his employment.
- 9. This is a complaint for damages based upon the following facts. CHRISTINE KEERS ("Keers") was employed by the City of Riverside, in the Riverside Police Department on May 15, 1981. From the commencement of her employment, until her termination, she was subjected to continuous discrimination and harrasment based upon her sex, as follows.
 - 10. During Keer's first two weeks of employment, she was

- and continuing throughout her patrol assignment, Keers was subjected to comments by the male officers which included, "Women cops were like snails. When they get up from their chairs, you can see the wet marks," and, "Look, can you see a wet trail from the scoot marks." These statements were made in the presence of sergeants, who were in charge of the roll call, were the offender's immediate supervisor and who did nothing to discourage the discriminatory comments. They were also made in the presence of numerous male officers.
- 12. At several of the initial roll calls, Officer Cook stated to Keers, "Come and scoot across my face." This was said in front of several male officers and on several occasions one or more other female officers.
- my fist up your butt." Ms. Keers, although thoroughly embarrassed by the comment, resorted to pretending that she did not hear such comments, in order to continue to work in the department. In this instance, the comment was made in the presence of numerous other officers who laughed at the comment. Ms. Keers mentioned this to her boyfriend, a Special Agent with the Riverside Police Department at the time, but stressed she did not want to make a formal complaint as her peers would surely ostracize her, so he spoke to Officer Cook's partner and close friend, Dave Warr, about the comments and

- 14. On numerous occasions, Ms. Keers was placed in a position where she had to hear senior officers discuss which female officers "gave the best head." Ms. Keers was also subjected to numerous comments about the male officers taking a female civilian employee in to the parking lot of the station, where they received a "blow job."
- 15. These officers openly discussed the female records clerks and, specifically, about one who had a "stinky pussy."
- 16. On these occasions, in order to avoid retaliation, Ms. Keers would pretend not to hear the comments. However, the officers would on occasion direct comments directly at Ms. Keers, asking questions like, "Chris, is your pussy stinky?" Many of these comments were made by senior officers who encouraged younger officers to participate in order to be one of the boys.
- 17. In one of the incidents, a female officer received a canine. The male officers would say in roll call, and in the presence of Ms. Keers, that the female canine officer was "fucking the dog" when she took him home.
- 18. It was well known that if a female complained, she would become an outcast and the situation would only get worse. The men would treat her more severely, either by increasing their assaults, by ignoring the officer entirely, or by not responding to her requests for assistance in the field.
- 19. During this initial phase, Ms. Keers tried desperately to ignore comments in order to survive her probationary period. She was concerned that if she complained she would be branded a trouble maker and terminated. As many of the comments were made in the

 presence of supervisors who ran the roll calls, Ms. Keers expected that they would take action without her need to say anything. In fact, this action was sanctioned by management, as they took no action to stop it, and many times would join in, with smiles or laughter. It soon became apparent that any complaint would not be met with discipline against the offending officers, and worse, any discipline given an officer would be minimal and only result in more retaliation against Ms. Keers.

- 20. During this probationary period, Ms Keers was told by several officers that they would not have a woman back them up on any calls merely because they were females. These comments were made by both younger officers and by supervising officers.
- 21. These officers referred to the women officers as the "pussy platoon" or the "snail detail." During one roll call the supervisor, Sergeant Carl Weber, referred to two other female officers, who prior to this roll call had been partners in the same car, as the "cunt car" and separated them. This comment was made in the presence of Ms. Keers who was assigned to a one person car at the time, but was hoping to gain a two person assignment with one of the other female officers on this platoon as all the females sought refuge from these assaults in pairs.
- 22. Whenever Ms. Keers met any male officer for lunch, the other officers insinuated that since she was having lunch with him, she must be sleeping with him. This comment was made by officers clicking their microphones. The "click" is a manner of expressing laughter while at the same time, it could not be traced to any particular officer, however, its meaning was clear and specifically targeted Ms. Keers.

 23. While in training, Keers was told by a female training officer that women had to prove themselves twice as much as the males. Ms. Keers learned by watching this officer's manner of ignoring comments and learned that you have to ignore the comments in hopes that they would eventually cease or no one would associate with you.

24. In 1983, Ms Keers learned that, "Chris Keers, what a bitch," had been scratched on the bathroom wall of the male locker room at the police station. She complained to a Lieutenant who had it removed. Ms. Keers learned that it reappeared one week later with the epithet that Ms. Keers was a "whore."

25. Ms. Keers sat in roll calls where comments were made about her breasts and about other women being "hose monsters." Ms. Keers had to listen to comments about what a good "blow job" a certain woman officer gives, and comments that the officer would "fuck anyone who would buy her a drink." This woman officer was a close friend of Ms. Keers and, like Ms. Keers, a young officer trying to be a good and professional officer in a hostile environment. Ms. Keers knew that these remarks concerning her friend were not true and were said only to demoralize and discredit female officers.

26. On one occasion, when a sergeant was promoted, Ms. Keers was the only female officer on the swing shift watch. After roll call started, Ms. Keers was surprised when an unannounced pornographic video tape was shown in his honor. Ms. Keers was so embarrassed that she put her head down on the desk in an effort to avoid viewing the film. However, the male officers began making comments like, "Hey Keers look, can you do that?" Eventually, Keers got up and left the roll call room. Shortly afterwards, the watch

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Beginning in 1981, while in her probationary period, and 27. culminating in 1985, there was an incident of harassment by her male supervising officer. He brought Ms. Keers wine and flowers to work. He would set up pretextual meetings with Ms. Keers at El HiHo and Magnolia Streets and the airport which were dark places, by calling for a supervisorial meeting over the police radio under the guise that it was police business. He would make advances toward Ms. Keers. Ms. Keers objected, indicating that she should be doing her patrol job. He would respond that he was just trying to make her feel welcome in the department. Ms. Keers repeatedly told this officer that she did not want to meet unless it was in fact police He would become agitated and insist on the meetings. business. When she told this officer that her peers were talking about it, clicking their radios, and that Keers felt like he was singling her out for personal attention, the supervisor responded, "Let me worry about those guys, I'm the sergeant." On another occasion, Ms. Keers was involved in a pursuit. After the pursuit ended and at the scene of the arrest of the suspects, this sergeant put his arms around Ms. Keers, saying, "good job." Ms. Keers jerked away. A fellow male officer, who witnessed this unusual display by a supervisor, made the comment, "Gee, the sergeant didn't give me a hug and it was my pursuit!"

28. Later this supervisor approached Ms. Keers and requested that she meet him for coffee, however, Keers declined. Later that day, while Keers was in route to a meeting with a school official

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assisted the assigned officers by stabilizing the situation until This was a standard and expected police practice. After the assigned officer had obtained information from Ms. Keers and she was about to clear and continue on to the school meeting, Sergeant Laird arrived and immediately began screaming at Officer Keers in the presence of the other officers. He concluded with, "You were here first, you handle this call" and, then, he left the scene without giving her an opportunity to respond. This was not common practice or procedure. Typically, as a non-patrol officer, her job under such circumstances was to stabilize the situation and wait for the assigned patrol officers to arrive and handle the call. Ms. Keers was so upset by the supervisor's actions, officer Avila, to whom the call was assigned, said to Ms. Keers, "It's my call I'll handle it." Ms. Keers, uncertain whether this would be proper or not, called to Sergeant Laird on the radio and informed him that officer Avila preferred to handle the call as he was the assigned, officer and asked him "if he had given her a direct order to handle the call?" Sergeant Laird responded, "It could be, however, if you want to meet me at Shammel park we can discuss it." Due to the severity of this incident, Ms. Keers filed a The incident was

- formal complaint against Sergeant Laird. investigated and Sergeant Laird was disciplined with 30 days off without pay and placed on probation for this conduct. However, the discipline was immediately set aside.
 - In another incident, in 1986, Ms. Keers and another woman

officer were beat partners in one officer cars on the east side of town. Dispatch assigned a call to the other female officer with Ms. Keers to backup. A male sergeant, however, came on the radio and said, "cancel one of the female officers and send a male officer." This radio conversation was followed by the customary radio clicking. Ms. Keers responded to the scene and demanded to know why this had been done. The male sergeant told her that the call, "needed a man." Ms. Keers told the sergeant that this call did not need a man anymore than any other call they had handled. She emphasized that female officers receive the same training as male officers and are not only expected to carry their own weight, but want to and are qualified to do so. Ms. Keers told the sergeant that his countermanding of the assignment on the air inappropriate as well as embarrassing to her and all female Ms. Keers and the other female officer demanded an apology from the sergeant over the air, undoing as much as could be expected, his error. The supervising officer acknowledged he had made an error and said he would correct it over the air. sergeant then drove away and said over the radio, "I'll be 10-8 (back in service) assist the stranded female officers", with no apology forthcoming. When this incident was brought to the captain's attention, he refused to have the sergeant apologize or to take any action against him, saying only, "such an action is within the sergeant's prerogative." Without the required support from management, it was difficult for Ms. Keers and other women officers to command the respect needed to perform their jobs.

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31. In 1987, Ms. Keers was promoted to detective. At that time, posted on a department memo and taped on the elevator wall,

officers should not be permitted to make such comments and that they are in violation of department policy. The lieutenant responded that he could do nothing about it, that men will talk and the worst thing for Keers to do is to confront them on it. He told Keers to, "hang in there, it will get better."

- 36. As the only female detective Ms. Keers, who was handling twice as many cases as the next closest detective, was advised by her supervisor, Sergeant Mackey, when she brought this to his attention with supporting documentation, that she "needed to develop a thick skin if she intended to last as a detective." He then announced to everyone in the room that Keers "was in a bad mood because she had been given work to do and that she thinks she is special and doesn't have to do the same as everyone else."
- 37. On another occasion, a detective, Dennis Macula, was telling a fellow officer about Ms. Keers sexual preference. Later the detective heard that Keers had been advised of the comments and he came to Ms. Keers and apologized.
- 38. As time passed, Keers, now a seasoned officer, attempted to defend herself, however, all the attempts failed and the attacks on her only became worse as a result.
- 39. In 1989, when Keers yawned in the bay, Detective Ron Adams commented "Look her mouth is open, she must be trying to get promoted". This was said in the presence of some of the detectives in the detail and the sergeant, Michael Smith, who just grinned in acknowledgment of the comment.
- 40. While in the Detective bureau, Keers received several messages on her voice mail at work with a male saying things like "Bitch, you are going to die", and "Bitch" and then hanging up.

- 41. In 1990, Keers was confronted by a sergeant and told that a person of higher rank had informed him that Keers and another female officer, Kathy Myerchen, were spending too much time having coffee in the mornings. However, there was no mention of the fact that four male officers were also having coffee during the same periods and sitting at the same table.
- 42. In 1990, Sergeant Mackey told the persons team a male officer and Keers were teamed on a prostitute case because the male officer knew the prostitutes and "Keers was one."
- 43. In 1992, a male detective complained that he did not want to work a particular beat because it was too busy. Consequently, and without discussing it with Detective Keers, she was reassigned to the busier beat and he was given her beat. When Ms. Keers complained she was told to, "shut up and do what she was told."
- 44. In 1992, there was a discussion with several detectives regarding another detective's wife taking a Sergeant's test at Corona Police Department. Keers indicated that she wished her well. At this point Keers was told by the male Sergeant, "then go to Corona if you want to get promoted". Keers inquired "why would I want to go to Corona to get promoted?". The sergeant said "if you ever want to get promoted, you'll have to, "cause you'll not see it here."
- 45. In 1992, during a homicide unit meeting, a question was asked by Sergeant Mackey about a sailors knot being used in the Hector Herredia murder case. Keers attempted to answer the question by saying that sailor knots are not being taught to new recruits in the navy. Sergeant Mackey asked how she knew this and she started to

explain that her son had recently gone through Navy recruit training, at which time, Detective Adams said, "Because she is doing the seventh fleet." There was a great deal of laughter as a result of the comment. Keers was embarrassed and left the room. After she left the meeting, Detective Keith Kensinger said, "That's why we shouldn't have women working here." Shortly thereafter, Detective Adams followed her into the hallway and said, "I was just kidding I was just trying to get a laugh." Keers informed him she did not appreciate being the brunt of his jokes. The Sergeant subsequently contacted Ms. Keers and asked what she wanted him to do regarding this incident. She informed the sergeant that she felt the officer should be told that what he had done was not right, that she would like him to apologize and informed that it better not happen again. The sergeant called the officer in the room with Keers and said, "Now tell me Chris (Keers), what do you want me to do to him?" Ms. Keers was intimidated by this confrontation with this officer and the teaming of the two men against her. She responded that she only wanted to be treated professionally and as an equal. After the incident, Detective Adams did not speak to Keers for more than three months and attempted to enlist the other detectives to side with him in alienating her. As a result of this effort some of the detectives in the unit gave Keers the cold shoulder as well.

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46. In January, 1993, Keers was called into the lieutenant's office. The lieutenant said that there was a misunderstanding due to a telephone being left off the hook. The unit secretary had overheard a male officer make numerous remarks about the women officers in the department. These comments included a reference to a particular woman as, "just a brood mare," stating that, "women do

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not know their place," and that the officer "could not think of a one worth her salt." These comments also included a reference to the time when Ms. Keers and Officer Kathy Myerchen were dispatched to a call in which the supervisor cancelled Ms. Keers in order to send a male officer. This was followed by several more derogatory comments about Ms. Keers and Ms. Myerchen. The secretary was offended, hung up the phone, reported the incident, and requested the rest of the day off. Instead of taking appropriate action against the offending officers, Ms. Keers was told by the lieutenant not to talk to the secretary about the incident as it would only upset her more.

- 47. Throughout her career as a detective, Ms. Keers was falsely accused of sleeping with her unit partners. It made no difference who it was. When Ms. Keers' partner denied the comments, the denials were met with snickers and comments of disbelief.
- 48. In 1989, Keers began testing for Sergeant. She was the only woman on the list and was passed over for promotion several Keers filed a grievance with the City and the Police times. Department. Chief Richardson called Keers into his office and in the presence of Randy Eggleston, the Union representative, stated that he agreed that women needed to be promoted, and that although he could not undo the most recent promotions, Keers would most likely be promoted. However, no promotion resulted. When a male officer with less time and grade, less experience, and who had received discipline in the past where Keers had not, was promoted to Sergeant, Keers asked Chief Richardson why he was promoted ahead of Chief Richardson said that, "he owed it to him for his faithfulness."

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Keers grievance was still in effect when Richardson's 49. replacement, Chief Fortier, was hired. Several positions became available due to forced retirements by the Chief. Keers was contacted by a male captain and told that the new chief did not like He stated that the chief said if Keers wanted to be grievances. promoted, she needed to drop her grievance. Keers asked what guarantees she would have that she would be promoted if she dropped The Captain replied that there were five Sergeant her grievance. promotions coming up and Keers would get one of those. Keers was told to think it over and let the captain know. Keers thought about it and then went back to the captain and told him that based upon his representation that she would be promoted, she would drop her grievance.

50. The following month several promotions were made. Contrary to the captain's promise, Keers was not promoted. Keers asked the captain what happened to her promotion. She was told that there were more promotions coming, to be patient. Keers waited until several other people were promoted, and again Keers was not. Keers then approached the captain and asked if anyone else was present with him and the Chief when the Chief told him to approach Keers to drop the grievance. The captain said "Let me think about that and I'll let you know." Keers waited approximately one week and not having heard from the captain, she drafted a memo to the Chief asking why he sent the Captain to her to drop her grievance if he had no intention of promoting her.

51. Approximately 20 minutes after dropping the letter off at the Chief's office, Keers was informed that the Chief wanted to see her at 2:00 p.m. Keers immediately contacted Randy Eggleston and

- 52. At the meeting, Chief Fortier said he would not be bullied or threatened into promoting anyone. Keers stated that there was nothing in her memo that was threatening, she merely wanted to know why this took place. Chier Fortier told Keers that he did not believe she could win a grievance on not being promoted, and Eggleston said "Oh we don't plan on filing that, we believe we have a law suit for unfair labor practices". The Chief said, "Yea you do, however, there are several promotions coming up and you're at the top of the list where you have always been, now I am not trying to talk you out of filing a law suit, I just want to let you know there are these promotions coming up."
- 53. Throughout Ms. Keers' career, she was subjected to "jokes" and innuendo of a sexual nature or in some way derogatory to women. Often these were in the form of cartoons or objects placed on her desk, or posted in the elevator for all to see. Attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "A" are examples of materials placed upon Ms. Keers' desk and posted in the elevator.
- 54. On July 8, 1994 Keers was promoted to Sergeant. Shortly thereafter, Keers was informed that an internal affairs investigation was being done. The promotion was a subterfuge in an attempt by the City to assert that it in fact did not discriminate against Keers on account of her sex or as retaliation for her grievence. It was a prelude to the ultimate plan to falsely charge

55. On August 17, 1994, Keers was taken into custody by Sgt. Brown, Detective Adams and Captain Smith for receiving stolen property. This was in retaliation for Ms. Keers' objections to her mistreatment on the basis of her sex and in retaliation for her grievance.

56. The arrest and resulting criminal charges against Ms. Keers were the result of a "sting" operation developed with the approval of CHIEF FORTIER. The "sting" was intentionally based upon the utilization of a known, unreliable informant who had been "black balled" by the Riverside Police Department. In exchange for the informant's making of false accusations against Ms. Keers, the informant was provided compensation in the form of lodging, meals, and money. All this was for the purpose of punishing a female officer who's only wrongdoing was that she wanted to be treated equally with the male officers.

57. Ms. Keers volunteered to take a polygraph test during the course of the investigation. The poligrapher was a law enforcement poligrapher often used by the Riverside District Attorney's office and the Riverside District Attorney supplied the questions for the test. As a result of her examination, Ms. Keers was judged to be truthful. Thereafter, the department refused to give credence to the test results. Ms. Keers volunteered to take a second polygraph. A second examination of Ms. Keers was conducted. Again, Ms. Keers was judged to be truthful. Again, the department refused to accept the results. Instead, Ms. Keers was disciplined and prosecuted. At the start of the investigation the Riverside District Attorney's

7 8 office informed the Riverside Police Department that they were not to use any informant who had a case to work off, were not to use any officer in the investigation who had a problem with Ms. Keers, and were not to make any arrest without the prior approval of the District Attorney's office. All of these conditions were violated.

- 58. Criminal charges were filed against Ms. Keers. This was done at the insistence of CHIEF FORTIER. Ultimately, Ms. Keers was tried by a jury, and Ms. Keers was acquitted of all charges. At the conclusion of the case, the jury greeted Ms. Keers with applause and expressions of appreciation for her character and fine work.
- 59. During the preparation of her defense, Ms. Keers did receive support from many of her fellow officers, including fund raising for a defense fund. CHIEF FORTIER undertook to prevent such activities, to the extent that he could limit the activities of officers working for him. Although other fund raising activities have been conducted by officers for various causes, only when an effort was made to assist Ms. Keers, was there an objection by the Chief of Police.
- 60. At all times mentioned herein, each individual defendant, was acting under color of state law.
- 61. The acts and omissions of the defendants and each of them were fraudulent, oppressive and malicious, and each of them acted with reckless or callous indifference to the rights of Plaintiff.
- 62. As a proximate result of defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of loss of employment, including both employment predating the filing of this complaint and employment into the future, with a resulting loss of salary and benefits, all according to proof, in an amount in excess of the

63. As a proximate result of defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff suffered general damages in the form of anxiety and emotional distress, in an amount according to proof at trial.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of Statutes Prohibiting Sexual Harassment)

- 64. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all Paragraphs of the General Allegations as though fully set forth herein.
- 65. Plaintiff CHRISTINE KEERS is a female and is a member of a protected class.
- 66. This action is brought pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Practices Act, Government Code sections 12900 et seq., and the corresponding regulations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and under other various provisions of the United State Codes.
- 67. At all times mentioned in this complaint, defendant CITY, and DOES 1 through 100, and each of them, regularly employed five or more persons bringing defendants, and each of them, within the provisions of Government Code sections 12900 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. 1983, which prohibit employers or their agents from discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual harassment of employees, and retaliation by reason of complaining of sexual discrimination and harassment.
- 68. On May 8, 1995, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). A true and correct copy of the charge is attached to this complaint as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference herein. On or about May 15, 1995, plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the DFEH. A true and correct copy of the notice is attached to

- 69. On August 16, 1995, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment and Opportunities Commission (EEOC). A true and correct copy of the charge is attached to this complaint as Exhibit "D" and incorporated by reference herein. On or about April 16, 1996, plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC. A true and correct copy of the notice is attached to this complaint as Exhibit "E" and is incorporated by reference herein.
- 70. At all times mentioned in this complaint, defendant CHIEF FORTIER was employed by defendant CITY, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, and each of them, as the CHIEF OF POLICE, and was plaintiff's ultimate supervisor.
- 71. Throughout plaintiff's employment with the CITY, City's employees repeatedly made verbal and visual comments of a sexual nature to plaintiff in an offensive manner, including those set forth in the general allegations, all of which constituted unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation.
- 72. Plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual comments, jokes and innuendo on a daily basis during the time of her employment with defendants, and each of them. These unwelcome sexual comments constituted unlawful sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and rendered plaintiff's employment environment hostile.
- 73. When Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge against Defendants, Defendants "framed" Plaintiff with criminal charges in retaliation for Plaintiff's lawful actions.
 - 74. The conduct of defendants, and each of them, as described

in this complaint, would have been offensive to any woman, and defendants were well aware of such offensive nature of the conduct. Plaintiff did not consent to such conduct, and found it unwelcome and offensive. Defendant's conduct rendered plaintiff's employment intolerable, and no reasonable person could have tolerated it.

- 75. Plaintiff frequently complained to her supervisors about the ongoing harassment of plaintiff and asked her supervisors to put a stop to it. Defendants failed and refused to address the ongoing harassment of plaintiff. Instead, any complaint only resulted in worse treatment.
- 76. Defendants' conduct as described in this complaint was malicious and was intended to oppress, humiliate, and denigrate plaintiff and was totally without justification. Plaintiff further alleges that the conduct of defendants in sexually harassing plaintiff was done while defendants' employee was on duty and was only possible due to defendants' employee's official status as plaintiff's supervisor, and was related to his performance of his official duties and was done in his capacity as a member of defendant employers' personnel while acting pursuant to his official, duty, and interfered with plaintiff's abilities to perform her duties.
- 77. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants, and each of them, were aware or should have been aware of such conduct and of the sexually hostile environment as it was open and obvious, and because plaintiff repeatedly complained about the sexual harassment.
- 78. Plaintiff alleges that by the failure to prevent or correct the discrimination and sexual harassment of plaintiff by its agents and employees, Defendants, and each of them, acted to condone

79. As a result of the unlawful conduct of defendants, and each of them, as alleged in this complaint, plaintiff has lost substantial employment benefits with defendant, including lost wages, bonuses, and other losses, in an amount according to proof at time of trial.

80. As a further direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of defendants, and each of them, plaintiff has suffered extreme and severe anguish, humiliation, emotional distress, nervousness, tension, anxiety and depression, the extent of which is not fully known at this time and the amount of damages caused thereby is not yet fully ascertained but in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdiction of this court, the precise amount to be proven at the time of trial. Plaintiff claims that amount together with prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3287 or any other provision of law providing for prejudgment interest.

- 81. The conduct of defendants as described in this complaint was oppressive, fraudulent and malicious, thereby entitling plaintiff to an award of punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of defendants, and each of them.
- 82. The acts and conduct of Defendants, and each of them, were under color of state law, pursuant to official unwritten policy and custom of the Police Department of CITY. Said policy and custom of the Department included discrimination against female officers and against females who brought a charge of discrimination against the Department and who otherwise exercised their constitutional rights.

83. CITY, and agents and employees acting on its behalf, including the individual defendants sued herein, were aware of this policy and custom and used their official positions to carry out that policy of discriminataion and retaliation. Defendants' policy and custom of discrimination and retaliation were aplied to Plaintiff and others similarly situated, thus violating their rights as guaranteed under the Constitutions of the United States of America and the State of California. Among other things, Defendants violated plaintiff's right to free speech and equal protection and deprived her of her constitutionally protected liberty and property interests without due process, resulting in her denial of timely promotions, and ultimately, pretextual criminal charges against her and her discharge from employment.

84. As a result of Defnedant's conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel to represent her. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award based on her reasonable attorneys' fees necessarily incurred in the preparation and prosectuion of this claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Tortious Discharge in Violation of Public Policy)

- 85. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all Paragraphs of the General Allegations and First Cause of Action as though fully set forth herein.
 - 86. From 1981 to 1994, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants,

- 87. As herein alleged, Plaintiff constantly complained to her supervisors of the ongoing sexual harassment.
- 88. The actions of defendants, and each of them, violated California Government Code Sections 12900 et. seq., 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the various administrative codes, statutes and regulations promulgated thereunder.
- 89. As a proximate result of Plaintiff's conduct as described above, and in violation of public policy, Defendants, and each of them, retaliated against Plaintiff for complaining about the harassment, the failure to promote her by reason of her sex, and the resulting intolerable working conditions by terminating Plaintiff by the method of fabricating criminal charges against her.
- 90. As a proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered harm, including lost earnings and other employment benefits, humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish, all to her damage in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 91. Defendants' conduct as described in this complaint was malicious and was intended to oppress, humiliate, and denigrate, plaintiff and was totally without justification. Plaintiff further alleges that the conduct of defendants in sexually harassing plaintiff was done while defendants' employee was on duty and was only possible due to defendants' employee's official status as plaintiff's supervisor, and was related to his performance of his official duties and was done in his capacity as a member of defendant employers' personnel while acting pursuant to his official duty, and interfered with plaintiff's abilities to perform her duties. In doing the acts set forth above, Defendants and each of

92. Defendant CITY, and each of them, ratified the aforementioned conduct of its employees by after learning of their conduct toward Plaintiff, failing and refusing to discipline or reprimand them.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Implied Contract of Continued Employment)

- 93. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all Paragraphs of the General Allegations and First and Second Causes of Action as though fully set forth herein.
- 94. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants, and each of them, for a period of approximately 14 years, and was assured that she would not be terminated arbitrarily allowing Plaintiff to conclude that Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an implied contract that Plaintiff would not be discharged unless there was good cause to do so.
- 95. Based on the oral representations of the defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff had an employment contract with Defendants, and each of them, that she would be employed by Defendants so long as her performance was satisfactory, and that Defendants would not discharge her without good and just cause.
- 96. The terms of the employment contract included, but were not limited to the fact that Defendants would not discharge Plaintiff without good and fair warning, based on objective, reasonable job evaluations.
 - 97. Plaintiff, at all times fulfilled her duties and

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98. Notwithstanding the implied promise to terminate the employment contract only for good cause, on or about August, 1994, Defendants, and each of them, terminated Plaintiff's employment on the alleged ground of alleged misconduct, even though Plaintiff knew her termination was in retaliation for complaining of sexual discrimination and filing a formal grievance.

99. Defendants' conduct as described in this complaint was malicious and was intended to oppress, humiliate, and denigrate plaintiff and was totally without justification. Plaintiff further alleges that the conduct of defendants in sexually harassing plaintiff was done while defendants' employee was on duty and was only possible due to defendants' employee's official status as plaintiff's supervisor, and was related to his performance of his official duties and was done in his capacity as a member of defendant employers' personnel while acting pursuant to his official duty, and interfered with plaintiff's abilities to perform her duties. In doing the acts set forth above, Defendants and each of them knew of the ongoing harassment. The advance knowledge and conscious disregard of these actions by Defendants and each of them, warrants the assessment of punitive damages.

100. As a proximate result of Defendants breach of the implied employment contract, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other employment benefits, all to her damage in a sum according to proof at the time of trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

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101. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all Paragraphs of the General Allegations and First, Second and Third Causes of Action as though fully set forth herein.

102. The employment agreement referred to above, contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which obligated Defendants, and each of them, to perform the terms and conditions of the agreement fairly and in good faith and to refrain from doing any act that would prevent or impede Plaintiff from performing any or all of the conditions of the contract that she agreed to perform, or any act that would deprive Plaintiff of the benefits of the contract.

103. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants, and each of them, for a period of about 14 years, and was assured that she would not be terminated arbitrarily allowing Plaintiff to conclude that Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an implied contract that Plaintiff would not be discharged unless there was good cause to do so.

104. Plaintiff performed all the duties and conditions of the employment agreement.

105. Defendants, and each of them, knew that Plaintiff had fulfilled all her duties and conditions under the contract.

106. Defendants, and each of them, breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the employment agreement by discharging Plaintiff intentionally, maliciously, and without probable cause, in bad faith and for reasons extraneous to the contract, because Plaintiff complained of sexual discrimination and filed a formal grievance. In fact, Defendants, and each of them, discharged Plaintiff, not because of alleged poor performance,

107. As a proximate result of Defendants' breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff has suffered, and continued to suffer, loss of employment benefits, to her damage in an amount to be ascertained. As a further proximate result of Defendants, and each of their breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff has incurred reasonable attorney fees in attempting to secure the benefits owed her under the employment contract.

malicious and was intended to oppress, humiliate, and denigrate plaintiff and was totally without justification. Plaintiff further alleges that the conduct of defendants in sexually harassing plaintiff was done while defendants' employee was on duty and was only possible due to defendants' employee's official status as plaintiff's supervisor, and was related to his performance of his official duties and was done in his capacity as a member of defendant employers' personnel while acting pursuant to his official duty, and interfered with plaintiff's abilities to perform her duties. In doing the acts set forth above, Defendants and each of them knew of the ongoing harassment. The advance knowledge and conscious disregard of these actions by Defendants and each of them, warrants the assessment of punitive damages.

(Unlawful Retaliation in Violation)

109. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all Paragraphs of the General Allegations and First, Second Third and Fourth Causes of Action as though fully set forth herein.

110. As a result of Plaintiff's filing of charges of discrimination on the basis of her gender, as hereinabove alleged, Defendants, and each of them, have engaged in the alleged conduct of refusing to promote her, wrongfully subjecting her to the described "sting" operation, and discharged her, as retaliation for her exercise of her rights under the law. As a direct result of Plaintiff's filing of charges, she has been the repeated target of retaliatory actions by said Defendants.

111. Defendants's retaliatory conduct was unlawful and in violation of Government Code Section 12940(f), which makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee opposing the employer's unlawful employment discrimination and to retaliate against an employee because the employee has filed a charge against the employer under FEHA, and in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 which also makes such retaliation unlawful.

112. As a result of the aforesaid acts, Plaintiff as suffered lost pay and benefits, and general damages in the form of future pecuniary loss, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses in amounts according to proof.

113. Defendants' conduct as described in this complaint was malicious and was intended to oppress, humiliate, and denigrate plaintiff and was totally without justification. Plaintiff further

alleges that the conduct of defendants in sexually harassing plaintiff was done while defendants' employee was on duty and was only possible due to defendants' employee's official status as plaintiff's supervisor, and was related to his performance of his official duties and was done in his capacity as a member of defendant employers' personnel while acting pursuant to his official duty, and interfered with plaintiff's abilities to perform her duties. In doing the acts set forth above, Defendants and each of them knew of the ongoing harassment. The advance knowledge and conscious disregard of these actions by Defendants and each of them, warrants the assessment of punitive damages.

114. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff is suffering, and will continue to suffer great and irreparable loss, damage and injury and is therefore compelled to seek injunctive relief compelling defendant CITY to cease and desist from all retaliatory conduct and return her to her rank of sergeant with all accrued seniority and benefits as though the wrongful, illegal and retaliatory conduct of CITY had not occured.

PRAYERS FOR RELIEF

- 1. For special damages, compensatory damages, and general damages against Defendants, and each of them, in an amount according to proof, including lost earnings and other employee benefits, past and future, costs of seeking other employment, and damages for emotional distress, humiliation, and mental anguish;
- 2. For punitive damages against defendants in an amount appropriate to punish defendants and deter others from engaging in similar misconduct, according to proof;
 - 3. For injunctive relief, including returning Plaintiff to

her employment with the CITY at the rank of sergeant, with all accrued seniority and benefits from the date of her discharge, and enjoining Defendants, and each of them, from further discriminatory and retaliatory conduct against Plaintiff;

- 4. For costs and reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
 - 5. For prejudgment interest on all sums recovered; and
 - 6. For such further relief as the court deems proper.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury.

DATED: April 23, 1996.

LAW OFFICES OF LAVOIE & JARMAN

Robert L. Lavore

Attorneys for Christine Keers

* * * EMPLOYMENT * ~ *

COMPLAINT OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT

DFEH # E 94-95 J-1180-00sc

DFEH USE ONLY

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND	
MS CHRISTINE KEENS	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area
76340 RINGBIT CT	
RIVERSIDE, CA 92506	COUNTY COUNTY
NAMED IS THE EMPLOYER. LABOR ORGANIZATION. EMPLOYMENT AGENCY. APPRIOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR INDIVIDUAL WHO DISCRIMINATED AGAINST	ENTICESHIP COMMITTEE ST
CITY OF RIVERSIDE / POLICE DEPT	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area
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BERTHADONO OFFICE has matter in count. I hereby request that the Department of Fair Employment thorization to file a lawsuit	and Housing provide an
have not been opened into making this request, nor do I make it based on fear of retaliation is the Department of Fair Employment and Housing's policy to not process or reopen a complain osed on the basis of "Complainant Elected Count Action"	of I do not do so i understant nt once the complaint has been
declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct of my own knowledge existormation and belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be type.	xcept as to matters stated on my
100 5-8-85 (Brulene K100	ND
AUBLSIDE / COMPLANANT'S S	SIGNATURE
SB: 1mc DATE FILED May 15, 199	95
(H. 3.17433-431-931)	STATE OF CALIFORN
EX B	SIAN OF CALIFORN

DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING

845 S. Business Center Drive, #127, San Bernardino, CA 92408-3426 09) 383-4373 TDD (213) 897-2840 FAX (909) 383-4746



May 15, 1995

CHRISTINE KEERS 16340 Ringbit Court Riverside, CA 92506

E9495-J-1180-00sc KEERS/RIVERSIDE, CITY OF, POLICE DEPARTMENT

NOTICE OF CASE CLOSURE

Dear Ms. KEERS:

The consultant assigned to handle subject discrimination complaint which you filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) has recommended that the case be closed on the basis of Complainant elected court action.

Please be advised that this recommendation has been accepted and your case has been closed effective May 15, 1995.

Since the DFEH will not be pursuing an accusation in your case, you have the right to file a private lawsuit in a California Justice, Municipal or Superior court. In the event a settlement agreement was signed resolving your complaint, it is likely that you have waived your right to file a private lawsuit. If that is the case, the following paragraph does not pertain to your circumstances.

If you have not already been notified of your right to file a private lawsuit, you have one year from the date of this letter to do so. (Refer to California Government Code Section 12965(b).) This case may be referred to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for further investigation.

Notice of Case Closure Page Two

You should be aware that the Department of Fair Employment and Housing does not retain case files beyond three years after a complaint is filed, unless the case is still open at the end of the three-year period.

Sincerely,

EARLENE M. HINTON

Earlene Modinton

District Administrator

cc: File

Human Resources Manager CITY OF RIVERSIDE 4102 Orange Street Riverside, CA 92501

DFEH-200-08(06/94)

CHARC)F DISCRIMIN		AGENCY	CHARGE NUMBER
This form is affected by the Privacy act of 1974; See Pricompleting this form.	vacy Act Statement belure	FEPA EEOC	345950938
CA Dept. Fair Employment & Housing and EEOC State or local Agency, if any			
NAME (Indicate Mr., No., Mrs.) HOME TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)			
Ms. Christine D. Keers		1) 780-6455
	AND ZIP CODE		DATE OF BIRTH
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	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, ME	MBERS TEL	EPHONE (Include Area Code)
City Of Riverside	Cat C (201-500)(909) 782-5231
3900 Main St., Riverside, CA 92501	AND ZIP CODE		COUNTY
HAME CA 92501		TELEPHONE N	UMBER (Include Area Code)
STREET ADDRESS			
CITY, STATE	AND ZIP CODE		COUNTY
CAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es	,,	DATE STORE	
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THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional space is needed, attach of	xtra sheet(s)):		
II. The reason given for the terminated was because I allegedly received stolen property. III. I believe that I was terminated because of my sex, Female and in retaliation for filing 2 internal sexual harassment complaints.			
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E.E.O.C.—San Diego EEOC/LADO			
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☐ I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State	HOTARY		
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ddress or telephone number and cooperate fully with them in the I swear or affirm that I have read the above charge and that			
processing of my charge in accordance with their procedures. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true			information and belief.
and correct.	SIGNATURE OF COMPLA	INANT	
S-16-75 Christing D. Keer Charging Party (Signature)	SUBSCRIBED AND SWO (Day, month, and year)	RN TO BEFO	DRE ME THIS DATE
EOC FORM 5 (Rev. 06/02)	<u> </u>	FILE	COPY

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U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE WITHIN 90 DAYS

DLP:RLW:ljt

Washington, DC 20530



April 16, 1996

APR 1 9 1996

CERTIFIED MAIL

Ms. Christine D. Keers c/o Robert L. Lavoie, Esquire Attorney at Law 888 South West Street, Suite 400 Anaheim, CA 92802

> EEOC Charge Against City of Riverside No. 345950938

Dear Ms. Keers:

Because you filed the above charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and more than 180 days have elapsed since the date the Commission assumed jurisdiction over that charge, and no suit based thereon has been filed by this Department, and because you through your attorney have specifically requested this Notice, you are hereby notified that you have the right to institute a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., against the above-named respondent.

If you choose to commence a civil action, such suit must be filed in the appropriate Court within 90 days of your receipt of this

The investigative file pertaining to your case is located in the EEOC Local Office, 401 B Street, #1550, San Diego, California 92101-4238.

This Notice should not be taken to mean that the Department of Justice has made a judgment as to whether or not your case is meritorious.

Sincerely,

Deval L. Patrick Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division

By:

Retallerson

Rita L. Wilson Civil Rights Analyst Employment Litigation Section

cc: EEOC Local Office City of Riverside